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I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Jason Cross (a/k/a Mikel Knight), 1203 Entertainment,
LLC, and MDRST Marketing/Promotions, LLC (collectively “Plaintiffs”) 
sued Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) for: (1) breach of written contract; (2) 
negligent misrepresentation; (3) negative interference with prospective 
relations; (4) deprivation of rights of publicity under California Civil Code 
§ 3344; (5) violation of rights of publicity under California common law;
and (6) unlawful and unfair business practices in violation of the California 
Business and Professions Code § 17200. (See Pl. Compl. at 8-11.)  The San 
Mateo County Superior Court held that Plaintiffs’ first three causes of 
action were barred by 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) of the Communications Decency 
Act (“Section 230”), which provides certain immunities to companies that 
operate “interactive computer service[s].” (Judge Ayoob Order at 4 (May 
31, 2016)).  The Superior Court ruled that Plaintiffs’ three remaining three 
claims could proceed because “[i]n California, rights of publicity claims are 
intellectual property laws” and the Communications Decency Act 
“explicitly states, ‘Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or 
expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.’”  (Id. at 5 [internal 
citations omitted]).  Both parties appealed to this Court. 
The Court has accepted four amicus curiae briefs in this case, those 
of: (1) Public Citizen, Inc. (“Public Citizen Amicus”); (2) the Electronic 
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Frontier Foundation et. al (“EFF Amicus”); (3) Airbnb, Inc. et al. (“Airbnb 
Amicus”); and (4) Consumer Opinion, LLC and AVVO, Inc. (“Consumer 
Opinion Amicus”).  These organizations (collectively “Amici”) raised issues 
regarding Section 230’s intellectual property law exemption and the 
validity of Plaintiffs’ California state law claims.  This brief addresses those 
issues. 
II. ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs’ California intellectual property law claims should be
allowed to proceed because Section 230’s civil liability protection for 
providers of interactive computer services explicitly exempts “any law 
pertaining to intellectual property.” (47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).).  In California, 
publicity rights are a form of intellectual property. (Comedy III Products, 
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 387 [“The right of publicity . . 
. protects a form of intellectual property that society deems to have some 
social utility.”]; see also Judge Ayoob Order at 5 (May 31, 2016)).  The § 
230(e)(2) exemption is not limited to federal intellectual property claims, so 
Section 230 does not shield Facebook from Plaintiffs’ valid claims based 
on California state intellectual property law.  Plaintiffs urge the Court to 
affirm Judge Ayoob’s ruling. 
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A. SECTION 230’s INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
EXEMPTION IS NOT LIMITED TO FEDERAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAIMS
Judge Ayoob ruled correctly that Plaintiffs’ statutory and common 
law right of publicity claims could proceed because the plain language of 
Section 230 does not immunize “interactive computer service” providers 
from intellectual property claims. The legislative history of Section 230 
also does not suggest Congress intended to immunize service providers 
from intellectual property actions.   
1. The Plain Language of 47 U.S.C § 230(e)(2)
Indicates That The Exemption Is Not Limited To
Federal Intellectual Property Claims.
To interpret Section 230’s intellectual property exception, the Court 
must first “examine the language of the statute enacted as an initiative, 
giving the words their usual, ordinary meaning.” (People v. Canty (2004) 
32 Cal.4th 1266, 1276.)  Section 230 provides that: “No provider or user of 
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker 
of any information provided by another information content provider.” (47 
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).)  The statute defines an “information content provider” 
as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the 
creation or development of information provided through the Internet or 
any other interactive computer service.” (Id. § 230(f)(3).)  But this 
immunity provision comes with two important limitations: “Nothing in this 
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section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to 
intellectual property[,]” id. § 230(e)(2), and “Nothing in this section shall 
be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is 
consistent with this section[,]” id. § 230(e)(3). 
This ordinary meaning of these limitations clearly indicates that 
Section 230’s grant of immunity does not extend to Plaintiffs’ intellectual 
property claims.  Amici understand this and attempt to argue that this Court 
should ignore the ordinary meaning of § 230(e)(3) and instead interpret it to 
preempt all California laws “pertaining to intellectual property” because 
those laws are “inconsistent with” Section 230.  The Court should reject 
this invitation because it fails to account for the unambiguous meaning of 
the phrase “any law pertaining to intellectual property[,]” id. § 230(e)(2).  
As another court has noted, “In four different points in Section 230(e), 
Congress specified whether it intended a subsection to apply to local, state, 
or federal law.” (Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc. 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) 603 F.Supp.2d 690, 703.)  § 230(e)(1) refers to “any other 
Federal criminal statute,” § 230(e)(3) refers to “enforcing any State law” 
and “any State or local law,” and § 230(e)(4) refers to “any similar State 
law[.]” (47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1, 3-4) [emphasis added].).  But § 230(e)(2) 
does not refer to “any Federal law pertaining to intellectual property”; it 
refers to “any law pertaining to intellectual property” (id. [emphasis 
added].). 
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 In Atlantic Recording, the court held that the § 230(e)(2) intellectual 
property exemption encompassed both state and federal law.  The court 
reasoned that since the words “Federal,” “State,” and “Local” appeared four 
different times in subsection (e), if Congress wished to restrict § 230(e)(2)’s 
meaning to federal intellectual property claims, it would have done so. (603 
F.Supp.2d at 703; see also Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co. (2002) 534 U.S.
438, 452 [“[W]hen Congress includes particular language in one section of 
a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion.”]; Universal Communications Systems, Inc. v. 
Lycos, Inc. (1st Cir. 2007) 478 F.3d 413, 422-23 [intellectual property 
claims based on Florida state trademark law are not precluded by Section 
230]; Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall and Assoc. (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 135 F.Supp.2d 
409, 413 [state intellectual property law claims are not precluded by § 
230(e)(2) based on the plain language of that subsection]).  Section 230 as a 
whole also purports to sets forth “the policy of the United States” with 
respect to both “Federal or State regulation.”  (Id. § 230(b)(2).)  This 
context from § 230(b) further reinforces the notion that “any law pertaining 
to intellectual property” means either state or federal law. 
Other courts have adopted this ordinary meaning of § 230(e)(2) as 
well.  In Gucci America, Inc. v. Hall & Associates, for example, the court 
stated that the plain language of the intellectual property provision 
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precludes users or providers of interactive computer services from having 
immunity against state intellectual property law claims. ((S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
135 F.Supp.2d 409, 413.)  The First Circuit has followed Gucci America 
and also held that Section 230 immunity did not apply to state intellectual 
property claims. (Universal Communication Systems, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc. (1st
Cir. 2007) 478 F.3d 413, 423 n.7.)  This Court should adopt the same logic 
and reject Amici’s invitation to disregard the ordinary meaning the phrase 
“any law” in § 230(e)(2).  
2. The Legislative History of 47 U.S.C § 230(e)(2)
Confirms That The Exemption Is Not Limited To
Federal Intellectual Property Claims.
The legislative history of the Communications Decency Act 
confirms that Section 230’s intellectual property exemption encompasses 
both state and federal intellectual property law claims.  At the time of 
Section 230’s enactment, “Congress wanted to encourage the unfettered 
and unregulated development of free speech on the Internet, and to promote 
the development of e-commerce.” (Batzel v. Smith (9th Cir. 2003) 333 F.3d 
1018, 1027; see also 141 Cong. Rec. H8469-72.)  Amici argue that 
Congress passed the Communications Decency Act primarily to encourage 
development of free speech on the internet.  Plaintiffs agree that this may 
have been one of Congress’s goals, but Amici oversimplify the story by 
glossing over Congress’s other motivations.  For instance, as the name 
“Communications Decency Act” implies, Congress also sought to protect 
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minors from obscene material (E.g., 141 Cong. Rec. H8469-72 [statements 
of Representatives Cox, Wyden, Lofgren, and Goodlatte admitting as 
much]).  The Communications Decency Act ultimately struck a balance 
between these competing interests. 
The specific circumstances surrounding the enactment of Section 
230 also support Plaintiffs’ proposed plain meaning interpretation. 
Representatives Cox and Wyden, the primary architects of the amendment 
that became Section 230, appeared to be particularly concerned with 
overruling a New York state case called Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy 
Services Co. (May 24, 1995) 1995 WL 323710. (See 141 Cong. Rec. 
H8469-72.)  In Stratton Oakmont, a New York trial court held that an 
online service provider could be liable as a publisher of defamatory content 
posted by third parties to its website. See 1995 WL 323710 at *10. 
Representatives Cox and Wyden accordingly designed a relatively narrow 
amendment to “protect[] from liability online services that make a good 
faith effort to restrict access to offensive material.” (Robert Cannon, The 
Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency Act: 
Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway (1996) 49 FED.
COMM. L.J. 51, 68.).  These Representative reasoned that providers that 
made a “good faith effort to restrict access to offensive material” should not 
have to “screen each of their millions of postings for possible problems[.]” 
(Zeran v. America Online, Inc. (4th Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 327, 331.) 
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Plaintiffs are not asking Facebook to “screen each of [its] millions of 
postings for possible problems[.]”  On the contrary, they asked the service 
to address a discrete number of messages that presented a demonstrable 
harm to Mr. Knight and his employees.  These messages involved death 
threats against Mr. Knight and his employees, false accusations about Mr. 
Knight’s business that caused attacks on his employees and his property, 
and false statements which caused baseless 9-1-1 calls that have wasted the 
resources of police departments.  Plaintiffs notified Facebook of the 
existence of these specific posts and submitted affidavits to the company 
demonstrating the violent effects of keeping them online.  Facebook 
erroneously stated that the company was not in a position to act on the 
reported content and refused to respond. 
The architects of Section 230 intended to create a limited immunity 
for content providers that “make a good faith effort to restrict access to 
offensive material[.]” (Cannon, supra, at 68.)  Facebook failed to do so 
here.  The Court should acknowledge the multiple motivations behind the 
Communications Decency Act and adopt Plaintiffs’ proposed plain 
meaning interpretation of Section 230. 
3. The Cases Amici Cite Limiting § 230(e)(2) to
Federal Intellectual Property Claims Are Not
Binding and Are Readily Distinguishable.
Amici cite cases in which courts have held that Section 230 
immunity can preclude certain state intellectual property claims.  But these 
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cases are not binding on this Court and are readily distinguishable. 
Plaintiffs’ claims arise under California statutory and common law and are 
properly classified as intellectual property claims. (E.g., Aroa Mktg., Inc. v. 
Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 781, 788.) Amici 
rightly point out that the appellate court in Hartford did not decide the issue 
of whether a right of publicity claim implicates Section 230. But that court 
did note that Black’s Law Dictionary includes “publicity rights” within its 
definition of “intellectual property,” id., which would close the inquiry 
under the plain meaning interpretation discussed above. 
Amici rely heavily on Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, a case in which 
the Ninth Circuit stated that Section 230’s exemption for “any law 
pertaining to intellectual property” referred only to federal intellectual 
property law. ((9th Cir. 2007) 488 F.3d 1102.)  That court emphasized the 
lack of any explicit definition from Congress for this phrase. (Perfect 10., 
488 F.3d at 1118.)  In the years following Perfect 10, many courts have 
criticized the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion.  One stated bluntly that the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning “lacks any support in the plain meaning” of the 
statutory text. (Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) 603 F.Supp.2d 690; see also Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc. 
(N.H.D.C. 2008) 540 F.Supp.2d 288, 299 [“[T]his court does not find the 
Ninth Circuit’s resolution [in Perfect 10] of the statutory interpretation 
question to be persuasive.”].)  In any event, Ninth Circuit opinions do not 
	10 
bind this Court. (E.g., People v. McCoy (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 974, 982 
[“Even on federal questions . . . Ninth Circuit cases do not bind the state 
courts.”].) 
The court in Perfect 10 also seemed to state in a footnote that the 
First Circuit in Universal Communication Systems did not reach the 
question regarding Section 230’s intellectual property exemption. (See 
Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1118 n.5.)  But the First Circuit in fact did apply the 
ordinary meaning of the words “any law pertaining to intellectual 
property,” cited Gucci America’s similar application of the exemption, and 
held that the exemption included state intellectual property law. (Universal 
Communication Systems, 478 F.3d at 423.)  There, the First Circuit 
ultimately held that the plaintiff’s claim failed under the standards of the 
relevant state intellectual property law—not that the claim was barred by § 
230(c) immunity. (See id. 423 n.7 [“We reason somewhat differently, 
holding that even though Section 230 immunity does not apply, the claim 
was properly dismissed as a matter of trademark law.”].)  The First 
Circuit’s holding in Universal Communication Systems is consistent with 
the ordinary meaning of Section 230’s intellectual property exemption. 
Amici also refer to the California Supreme Court’s discussion of 
Zeran v. American Online, Inc. in Barrett v. Rosenthal. (See Airbnb Amicus 
at 15; Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 58; Zeran v. American 
Online, Inc. (4th Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 327.)  It is important to note, as Amici 
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quoted, that the Supreme Court’s discussion of “the rule announced in 
Zeran and followed in all other jurisdictions” pertained only to “defamation 
plaintiffs” and “noticed-based” negligence concerns that were covered by 
Section 230 immunity.  (See Airbnb Amicus at 15; Barrett, 40 Cal.4th at 
58.)  The California Supreme Court did not address publicity rights claims, 
which are explicitly exempted from Section 230.  Intellectual property 
claims like Plaintiffs’ are entirely consistent with Section 230 and Supreme 
Court’s discussion in Barrett.  (See Barrett, 40 Cal.4th at 58.) 
B. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS HAVE NOTHING TO DO
WITH DEFAMATION
Plaintiffs’ claims arise under California state law and pertain to 
publicity rights and unlawful business practices. (Pl. Compl. at 11; Judge 
Ayoob Order at 6 (May 31, 2016).)  Plaintiffs are also not “pleading 
defamation claims as something else[.]” (See Consumer Opinion Amicus at 
5.).  They are seeking to vindicate their rights under California statutory 
and common law on intellectual property and unfair business practices. 
(Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, 17203; Civ. Code § 3344.) 
Amici attempt to argue that Plaintiffs have pleaded mere defamation 
claims in a way that circumvents Section 230 immunity in order to “hold 
Facebook liable for allegedly false content critical of [the Plaintiffs], and 
allegedly damaging to their reputations that was authored by Facebook 
users.” (See Airbnb Amicus at 17-18.)  This argument dangerously 
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mischaracterizes Plaintiffs’ case.  Plaintiffs’ publicity rights claims arise 
from Facebook’s decision to “knowingly and intentionally” use Plaintiffs’ 
likeness without consent, “for the purpose of advertising” and for 
Facebook’s “commercial advantage.” (Pl. Compl. at 11.)  These publicity 
rights claims can be brought regardless of whether any the content at issue 
tends to be positive or negative because the claims focus on the 
unauthorized use of another’s “name, voice, signature, photograph, or 
likeness, in any manner . . . or for purposes of advertising or selling, or 
soliciting purchases.” (Civ. Code § 3344.)  Holding a computer services 
provider liable for “allegedly defamatory content,” which Amici are 
concerned about, is far different from the present situation of holding the 
Facebook liable for its knowing and unauthorized use of another’s likeness 
in violation of California laws. (See Airbnb Amicus at 18 [citing Stratton 
Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710 ].)  Plaintiffs have independent claims that may 
be brought under California state law.  
Traditional defamation claims focus on the intentional act of the 
party that publishes defamatory content. (See Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 
Cal.4th 683, 796 [explaining that traditional defamation analysis that 
focuses on the words of the speaker].)  Here, the focus is largely on what 
happened after the content was produced—namely Facebook’s refusal to 
remove the content.  Plaintiffs are not merely “relabeling a defamation 
claim under another theory of liability” to circumvent the Section 230 
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protection that “Congress intended,” but rather is allowing California state 
law claims, on which the “Plaintiffs have shown” have a “probability of 
prevailing,” to proceed in accordance with the explicit exemption of § 
230(e)(2) for “any law pertaining to intellectual property.” (Airbnb Amicus 
at 19; Judge Ayoob Order at 6 (May 31, 2016).)  Holding Facebook 
responsible for intellectual property law causes of action, which are 
explicitly exempted from Section 230 immunity by § 230(e)(2), is far 
different from trying to hold a content provider liable for causes of action 
that are not exempted. (See Airbnb Amicus at 20 [citing negligence as an 
example of a cause of action protected by § 230(c) immunity].)  The 
essential nature of the right of publicity and derivative unfair business 
practices claims is not to “impose on Facebook liability for allegedly 
defamatory third-party content,” Airbnb Amicus at 21, but rather is to hold 
the Defendant liable for violating rights of publicity and committing unfair 
business practices. 
Facebook’s conscious choice to not remove content—including that 
concerning publicity rights and business matters—once the Plaintiffs had 
notified Facebook of the content’s existence created independent and 
legitimate claims that arise under California law.  These claims should be 
allowed to proceed accordingly.  
// 
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C. THE PRESENT CASE POSES NO THREAT TO
SECTION 230
Plaintiffs have asserted claims under California state law. (See Pl. 
Compl. at 11; Judge Ayoob Order at 6 (May 31, 2016).)  As discussed 
above, these claims are consistent with the provisions of Section 230. 
There is no reason this case should not be allowed to proceed under the 
pertinent laws. 
Amici express concerns that this case could “cripple the growth and 
development of the Internet industry” and threatens the Section 230 
protections for “providers or users of interactive computer services.” (See 
Airbnb Amicus at 22.)  This is a dramatic overstatement.  This case can be 
decided for the Plaintiffs under California law consistent with Section 230’s 
protections for internet services.  As detailed out in the first section of this 
response, Section 230 has a specific exemption for intellectual property 
law. (See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).)  Plaintiffs’ intellectual property claims are 
entirely consistent with Section 230.  Amici also argue that Section 230 
demands “that only the actual creators of online content that causes harm 
should be subject to potential liability.” (Airbnb Amicus at 23.)  This is 
plainly incorrect, as it would render Section 230’s intellectual property 
exemption meaningless.  Claims like Plaintiffs’ must allowed to proceed. 
Additionally, as addressed in Section II of this brief, Plaintiffs’ 
claims do not attempt hold Facebook liable for all actions of its many users. 
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This case focuses on Facebook’s specific, conscious refusal to remove 
certain content pertaining to the Plaintiffs, including their likeness, once the 
Plaintiffs notified it of the content’s existence and requested removal.  This 
is a narrow factual circumstance that does not threaten Facebook’s general 
operations.  Plaintiffs have no interest in attempting to hold Facebook liable 
for every action of its users. (See Airbnb Amicus at 27.)  
Finally, Amici worry that other persons might follow Plaintiffs and 
bring publicity rights claims against online service providers. (See Airbnb 
Amicus at 23-24, 26-28.)  It is important to remember that such causes of 
actions can only arise if publicity rights violations actually occur.  If no 
violations occur, then the claims do not arise.  When such violations do 
occur, injured persons—such as Plaintiffs here—have the right to bring 
their cases under California law.  Amici frame this case as a conflict 
between California’s state intellectual property law and Section 230.  This 
is a false choice, as these laws do no conflict.  Plaintiffs’ causes of action 
should be allowed to proceed and Facebook should be held responsible for 
any violations. 
III. CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the decision below and allow Plaintiffs’
California state law claims to proceed.  Section 230’s plain language and 
legislative history support Plaintiffs’ interpretation exempting state 
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intellectual property claims from the statute’s limited grant of immunity.  
The contrary holdings of other courts, which are flawed in their reasoning 
and factually distinguishable from the instant case, are also not binding 
upon this Court.  Mr. Knight shares many of the concerns of Amici and 
support the development of free speech and the internet.  He does not want 
to remove critical speech from the internet—he merely wants content 
providers to remove salacious and violent speech from their websites after 
being given notice and evidence of a concrete connection to serious bodily 
injury.  California law guarantees him that right, so this Court should 
accordingly affirm the decision below.  
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